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From Individual Motives to Partial Consensus: A
Dynamic Game Model
Muhammad Umar B. Niazi and Arif Bu¨lent O¨zgu¨ler
Abstract—A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model
of opinion dynamics, where the agents’ motives are shaped
by how susceptible they are to get influenced by others, how
stubborn they are, and how quick they are willing to change
their opinions on a set of issues in a prescribed time interval is
considered. We prove that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in
the game if there is a harmony of views among the agents of
the network. The harmony may be in the form of similarity
in pairwise conceptions about the issues but may also be a
collective agreement on the status of a “leader” in the network.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as an
emergent collective behavior out of the local interaction rules
and individual motives.
Index Terms—Opinion dynamics, social network, consensus,
dynamic game theory, optimal control.
I. INTRODUCTION
The models describing opinion dynamics are quite helpful
in explaining the situations of conflict and conformity in
a society. These models, in addition to social sciences and
economics, also find a variety of applications in the fields of
engineering and computer science, [38] – [40]. They have thus
attracted a diverse community of researchers in different fields
as evidenced by [1], [25], [28], and [29], in which several such
models are surveyed. The earlier ones, like DeGroot’s model,
[12], describe how members reach a consensus on an issue
by averaging the opinions with others via random repeated
interactions. But, a total consensus is hardly reached in reality
and it may be claimed that the situations of disagreements are
more common in a society, [27]. Bounded confidence models
like those of Hegselmann-Krause (HK), [21], and Deffuant-
Weisbuch, [11], explain disagreements in the form of network
clustering and polarization. Several variations of HK-model
with different convergence rate analysis have been presented
in [7], [15], [30], and [31].
In a social network, members interact with each other about
a set of prevailing issues for a finite time duration, they express
their opinions, listen to others’ and, hence, mutually influence
each other, [18]. Sometimes the influence is one-sided when
the interaction is based on passive observation. The opinions
of members are also highly influenced by their personal biases
and prejudices, which may arise due to their local information.
The frequency of interaction is higher between the members
who are characteristically similar to each other, [4], known as
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homophily, [25]. Hence, members usually tend to appreciate
and get influenced by those who are similar in ethnicity,
geography, etc. Moreover, the members also assent to each
other’s opinions based on ideological similarity, which is
characterized by their bounded confidences, [21]. When the
members are positively influenced by each other, they may
reach a consensus. But in the case of negative influences, [22],
they have antagonistic interactions, [3], [36], [41], where they
try to move away from each other in opinions.
The antagonistic interactions arise in our model from the
reaction of members, who take into account that some of the
issues may be interdependent or correlated. One assumption
we adopt is that a member will boycott those who hold incon-
sistent opinions, as he/she (we follow “he” below) perceives,
on correlated issues. Hence, members approve or boycott oth-
ers based on the consistency of their opinions on certain social
issues, [42]. Recently, in [35], a multidimensional extension
of Friedkin-Johnsen model, [18], along with the conditions of
stability and convergence is presented. In [35], the members
are assumed to be consistent in their belief system and they
avoid cognitive dissonance, [17]. That the humans are sensitive
to inconsistencies between actions and beliefs and that the
recognition of this will cause dissonance, which they will try
to resolve is a basic assumption to the theory. We recognize
the role of cognitive dissonance in two places in forming the
motive of a person. First, he may be more prone to or less
open to influence by people whom he believes are consistent
in their beliefs. Second, he may make an effort to be consistent
in his beliefs on correlated issues and this effort may be contra
to his stubbornness. This way, stubborn members may be
reluctant to change their opinions on the issues, [2], hence
avoiding to minimize their inconsistencies on the correlated
issues. However, they play a role in shaping the opinions of
the community, much like the e´minence grise of [9].
Here, we present a noncooperative differential (dynamic)
game model of opinion dynamics in a society, where the
agents’ (members’) motives are shaped by how susceptible
they are to get influenced by others, how stubborn they are, and
how quick they are willing to change their opinions on a set of
issues in a prescribed time interval. The motives depict their
social and psychological dispositions – to compromise fairly
on their personal biases in order to achieve conformity with
their neighbors in the network. We show by examples how an
agent may construct these parameters and incorporate into the
cost functional that constitutes a model of his motives. Each
agent is assumed to control the rate of change of his opinion
on each issue. The main objective of the investigation is to
determine under what conditions on the motives and network
2structure a Nash equilibrium of the game exists, and whether
or not it is unique. There are many notions of equilibrium in
games along with Nash equilibrium. An interpretation in [33]
for static games suggests that if a game is played several times
without any strategic links between consecutive plays, then a
Nash equilibrium is most likely reached. Nash equilibrium is
a useful construct whenever the objective is to probe under
what conditions a pattern of collective behavior emerges from
independent motives of agents.
We prove that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in the
game if there is some harmonious view among the agents in
the network. The harmony may be in the form of similarity
in pairwise conceptions about the issues but may also be
a collective agreement on the status of a “leader” in the
network. We determine the best response function of the
Nash equilibrium and the resulting opinion trajectories for
each agent, by making suitable assumptions on the network
topology and the nature of the influence and stubbornness
parameters. The theory developed here for one-stage, finite
time interval game can also be applied to infinite time interval
as well as to games with multiple stages. As applications,
we investigate two hybrid (continuous and discrete) games
of multiple stages, where the agents interact with each other
randomly with some probability [14], and they change their
opinions according to the influences of others that are depen-
dent on their heterogeneous bounded confidences, [21].
The construction of the motives of agents in our game is
similar to that of [19], in which an optimal update scheme
based on the best response dynamics of a static single-
issue game is presented and the question of convergence is
examined. Similar game theoretic models include [6], [16],
[20]. The dynamic game here is inspired by the foraging
swarm models in [34], [43], [44].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
define a dynamic game of opinions dynamics along with a
methodology to construct weight matrices. We also explain
how each entry of the weight matrices affects the behavior of
the agents. Then, in Section III, we determine explicit opinion
profile at Nash equilibrium and give the opinion trajectories
of each agent by making suitable assumptions on the network
topology. The proofs are deferred to Appendix. The single
issue results of Corollaries 2 and 3 have already been reported
in the conference publication [32]. This paper presents non-
trivial extensions of those results. Two examples of games with
multiple stages are presented in Section IV.
Notation: Vectors are denoted by bold lowercase letters
and matrices, by uppercase letters. The set of real numbers
and nonnegative real numbers are denoted by R and R+,
respectively. If B ⊂ A, then A \ B denotes those elements
of set A that are not in set B. For any set A, |A| denotes
its cardinality. The n × 1 vector of all ones is 1n and I is
the identity matrix of appropriate dimension, whereas Id is
the identity matrix of size d × d. The set of eigenvalues of
matrix A is denoted by eig(A). The transpose of a matrix A is
denoted by A′. The operator ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product
and L , the Laplace transform. A (block) diagonal matrix with
matrices A, ..., Z at its diagonal is written as diag[A, . . . , Z].
II. A GAME OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL OPINION DYNAMICS
Consider a social network where n people (agents)
N = {1, . . . , n} interact, discuss, and form opinions on d
prevailing issues in a set D. Every agent-i has some initial
biases bi = [bi,1 . . . bi,d]
′ ∈ Rd on the issues. Here, we let
bi,k assume any number in R = (−∞,∞) ranging from
strong refusal to complete support, with value zero indicating
neutrality or lack of opinion. People may update their initial
opinions in a time interval [0, T ], where T > 0 may also tend
to infinity. Let xi(t) = [xi,1(t) . . . xi,d(t)]
′ ∈ Rd denote the
vector of opinions of agent i at time t ∈ [0, T ] on d issues.
Thus, xi(0) = bi. The vector x(t) = [x
′
1(t) . . .x
′
n(t)]
′ ∈ Rnd
is the opinion profile of the network at t ∈ [0, T ]. The motive
that compels agent-i to update his opinions can be described
by postulating a cost functional that takes into account the
cumulative costs of (i) rapid changes in one’s opinions, (ii)
the tendency to preserve his mind set, and (iii) holding distinct
opinions from one’s neighbors. The model here puts forward
that every agent has a motive that may eventually dictate his
opinion dynamics and that such a motive, if not consciously
held, looms at the background in shaping his opinions. Thus,
the cost functional of agent-i given by
Ji(x,bi,ui) = 1
2
∫ T
0
{[
∑
j∈N
(xi − xj)′Wij(xi − xj)]
+ (xi − bi)′Wii(xi − bi) + u′iui}dt (1)
represents his motive, in which the matricesWij ,Wii ∈ Rd×d,
respectively, weigh the costs in (iii) and (ii) above. The third
term penalizes (i) as ui(t) := x˙i(t), ∀ i ∈ N, i.e., it is the
instantaneous rate of change of opinions of agent-i on d issues
and represents the cumulative control effort of agent-i when
integrated in (1). It should be understood that x(t, T ) and
u(t, T ) are functions of time t as well as the terminal time
T , and that we suppress the dependence on T for the sake of
brevity. We adopt the following throughout the paper.
Assumption 1: Wii is symmetric positive definite and Wij ,
i 6= j, is symmetric nonnegative definite, ∀ i, j ∈ N. 
The first term in the cost functional requires agent-i to
cooperate with his neighbors, the second term to preserve his
own biases and the third term to reduce the overall control
effort. By Assumption 1, the weight associated with the control
effort, normalized to identity in (1) rather than allowing it to be
a positive definite weight matrix, is without loss of generality.
The agents interact with their neighbors for a finite duration
[0, T ] and, due to an integral cost, every agent penalizes the
cumulative effect of each of the three terms in the integrand
during that duration. For instance, the first term does not
penalize the instantaneous differences but the sum total of
divergence from the opinions of the neighbors. Note that the
opinions xi(T ) at terminal time T are not specified and left
free. Thus, each agent minimizes his cost under free terminal
conditions, [26]. A noncooperative, continuous-time, open-
loop, infinite dynamic game (see [5], Section 5.3) is then
played by n agents:
min
ui
{Ji} subject to x˙i(t) = ui(t), ∀ i ∈ N. (2)
3This game is noncooperative because the agents seek their
own individual motives and there is no prevailing “social
motive” in the network. We assume that the control ui(t) ∈ Si,
∀ t ∈ [0, T ], and define Si to be a class of all permissible
strategies of agent-i, which are all continuously differentiable
functions si : [0, T ] × Rnd → Rd. A set of permissible
strategies {u∗1, . . . ,u∗n}, where u∗i (t) := s∗i (t,b), ∀ i ∈ N,
constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game (2) if, for all
permissible {u1, . . . ,un}, it holds that
Ji(u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
i−1,u
∗
i ,u
∗
i+1, . . . ,u
∗
n)
≤ Ji(u∗1, . . . ,u∗i−1,ui,u∗i+1, . . . ,u∗n)
for all b := [b′1 . . .b
′
n]
′ ∈ Rnd, where Ji(u1, ...,un) denotes
the value Ji of (1) resulting from the strategy ui = si(t,b),
for all i ∈ N.
We define the neighborhood of agent-i, Ni ⊂ N \ {i}, by
j ∈ Ni if and only if Wij 6= 0. Thus, any agent with whom
agent-i does not interact in [0, T ] is left out and others are
collected in Ni as neighbors. The summation in (1) can thus
be taken over Ni in place of N. We can think of the society
envisaged here as a network, in which every agent is a vertex
connected to his neighbor j, j ∈ Ni, by an edge that has
weights wij,kl (the kl-th entry of Wij ) associated with issues
k, l ∈ D. This is then a multiplex directed network of d layers,
[8].
If there is only one issue (d = 1) under consideration, then
(2) is the game considered in [32] (two main results of which
are repeated in Corollaries 1 and 2). Similarly, if the matrices
Wij and Wii are diagonal, then (1) will be minimum if and
only if the d functionals obtained by its decomposition are
minimum. In other words, the game then decomposes into d
independently played games on every issue separately. We now
make an attempt to justify the considerably more sophisticated
game obtained in the non-diagonal Wij cases.
A. On the Choice of Weight Matrices
The rationale in the choice of the weight matrices Wij , for
i, j ∈ N, by agent-i is encouraged by the role of attributes and
by the notion of bounded confidence outlined in [29], [21],
and [11], also being cognizant of the fact that in some cases
similar attributes may lead to competition, [37]. We also take
into account that a person’s opinion on an issue is a function
of the amount of information he has on that issue, [42]. The
interpretation in terms of the reflexive property “consistency
on two issues” for the off-diagonal entries of the influence
and stubbornness weight matrices given below justifies the
assumption of “symmetry” adopted by Assumption 1.
Let us first consider the influence weights and letWij = V
2
ij ,
j ∈ Ni, where Vij = [vij,kl]k,l∈D ∈ Rd×d, so that the
nonnegative definiteness of Wij is ensured. Suppose each
agent-i in the network possesses ‘a’ attributes such as social
status, area of expertise, religious and ethnic identity, etc.,
which can be represented by elements in some set A. Then, a
possible choice, for i ∈ N and j ∈ Ni, is given by
vij,kk =
{
γij,k(ai, aj), if |bi,k − bj,k| ≤ εi,
0, otherwise;
where γij,k : A × A → R+ and εi > 0 is the bounded
confidence threshold of agent-i. The off-diagonal entries of
matrices Vij , ∀ i, j ∈ N, can be chosen by
vij,kl =
{
ciri,kl, if vij,kk 6= 0 or vij,ll 6= 0,
0, otherwise;
where ri,kl ∈ [−1, 1] is the correlation coefficient between
issue-k and issue-l according to the conception of agent-i,
which when positive (or negative) indicates the positive (or
negative) correlation between the issues and ci ∈ R+ is a
proportionality constant that can be chosen dependent on the
attributes ai and aj . In order to see the effect of such choices
in the cost function of agent-i, consider the case of three
issues, where the (1, 2)-entry of Wij in terms of vij,kl is
wij,12 = vij,12(vij,11 + vij,22) + vij,13vij,23. The second term
vij,13vij,23 shows that if issue-1 and issue-2 are separately
correlated with issue-3, then opinions on issue-3 will also
affect the opinions on issue-1 and issue-2. Also, if the product
(xi,1 − xj,1)(xi,2 − xj,2) and wij,12 have opposite signs, then
the multiple of these terms will act as a repulsion term in (1).
So agent-i, in this case, will restrict himself to make consensus
with agent-j because, according to agent-i, agent-j does not
hold reasonable opinions.
The choice of entries of a stubbornness weight matrix Wii
follows an entirely similar rationale, by simply replacing the
agent-j in the narrative above by the initial belief of the agent-
i. The stubbornness on an issue is penalized by the diagonal
entries and the self-consistency on two issues by the off-
diagonal entries.
Example 1: Consider a dyad, a network of two agents, in-
teracting on two positively correlated issues, with initial biases
b1 = [0.3 0.3]
′ and b2 = [0.5 − 0.5]′. And suppose agent-1
has a one-way interaction with agent-2 (W21 = 0,W22 = I)
such that v11,kk = 0.1 and v12,kk = 1, for k = 1, 2; and
v1j,12 = r1,12, for j = 1, 2, resulting in
W12 =
[
1 r1,12
r1,12 1
]2
,W11 =
[
0.1 r1,12
r1,12 0.1
]2
.
Fig. 1 (a) shows the opinion trajectories on issue-1 and issue-
2 when r1,12 = 0 (no correlation) and Fig. 1 (b), when
r1,12 = 1. In latter case, since issue-1 and issue-2 are
positively correlated according to agent-1, and agent-2 holds
contradictory beliefs as agent-1 is aware of b2, it can be seen
that agent-1 moves away from agent-2 on issue-1. But as he
changes his opinion on issue-1, he also needs to change his
opinion on issue-2, towards that of agent-2, to minimize his
own inconsistency. △
B. Matrix Square Root and Hyperbolic Functions
In closing this section, we recall certain facts concerning the
square roots of matrices and some hyperbolic matrix functions.
Given a real matrix Q ∈ Rm×m, a (complex) square root
of Q is H ∈ Cm×m satisfying Q = H2. The conditions
for the existence of a square root are given in [24], Chapter
6. A square root always exists for a nonsingular Q and a
real square root of a nonsingular Q exists if and only if
Q has an even number of Jordan blocks of each size for
every negative eigenvalue. It is also well known that a real
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Fig. 1: Antagonistic interaction
positive (nonnegative) definite matrix has a unique real positive
(nonnegative) definite square root (see [23], Theorem 7.2.6),
which will be denoted by Q
1
2 . Let
f(Qt) :=
∞∑
k=0
Qk
t2k
(2k)!
, g(Qt) :=
∞∑
k=0
Qk
t2k+1
(2k + 1)!
,
h(Qt) :=
∞∑
k=0
Qk
t2k+2
(2k + 2)!
,
(3)
which converge for all Q since they are the inverse Laplace
transforms of rational matrices s(s2I − Q)−1, (s2I − Q)−1,
and s−1(s2I −Q)−1, respectively. If H is any square root of
Q, then, in (3), f(Qt) = cosh(Ht), Hg(Qt) = sinh(Ht), and
f(Qt) = I + Qh(Qt). Moreover, cosh(Ht) and H sinh(Ht)
are functions of Q and are independent of the choice of the
square root matrix H , whereas exp(±Ht) = cosh(Ht) ±
sinh(Ht) is dependent on its choice.
Fact 1: The matrix f(QT ) is singular if and only if Q has
a real negative eigenvalue −r2, r > 0, and T = (2k+1)pi2r for a
nonnegative integer k.
Proof: Let JQ = P
−1QP be the (complex) Jordan normal
form of Q for a nonsingular (complex) P . If T = (2k+1)pi2r
for some eigenvalue −r2 of Q, then a Jordan block Jr of any
size associated with this negative eigenvalue can be written as
−K2r , where Kr has r at its diagonal, −(2r)−1 at its upper di-
agonal, and zeros elsewhere. The corresponding Jordan block
of f(QT ) is then f(JrT ) =
∑
i≥0(−1)iK2ir T 2i/(2i)! =
cos(KrT ), the diagonal entries of which are zero if and only
if rT is an odd multiple of pi/2. If Q is singular, then let J0 be
a Jordan block associated with the eigenvalue zero, and note
by its series expression that f(J0T ) has ones at its diagonal,
i.e., nonsingular. Similarly, any other eigenvalue λ of Q is
nonreal or positive so that a Jordan block Jλ has a nonsingular
square root Hλ and f(JλT ) = cosh(HλT ) has eigenvalues all
nonzero, i.e., nonsingular. 
III. MAIN RESULTS
We present the existence and uniqueness results for the
game (2) in this section. Their derivation and the proofs
are deferred to the Appendix. We first focus on the Nash
equilibrium of the game in its most generality. In Proposition
1, we show, under mild conditions on weight matrices, that
(2) has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Consider (1), and let W := diag[W11, . . . ,Wnn] and
Q :=


M1 −W12 . . . −W1n
−W21 M2 . . . −W2n
...
...
. . .
...
−Wn1 −Wn2 . . . Mn

, (4)
with
Mi =Wii +
∑
j∈Ni
Wij , ∀ i ∈ N.
Note that Wij = 0 in (4) whenever j /∈ Ni. Also, by
Assumption 1, the block diagonal W is positive definite.
Whether Q is symmetric, nonsingular, nonnegative, or positive
definite, etc., depends on the choice of weight matrices as well
as the network structure.
Proposition 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then,
(i) A unique Nash equilibrium (u∗1, ...,u
∗
n) of the game (2)
exists in the interval [0, T ] if and only if the matrix f(QT ) is
nonsingular, in which case the Nash solution in t ∈ [0, T ] is
given by
u∗(t) = Q[h(Qt)f(QT ) + g(Qt)g(QT )]f(QT )−1(Q−W )b, (5)
where b := [b′1 ...b
′
n]
′, u∗(t) := [u∗1(t)
′ ...u∗n(t)
′]′, and the
resulting opinion profile in this Nash equilibrium is given by
x∗(t) = {I + [h(Qt)f(QT ) + g(Qt)g(QT )]
f(QT )−1(Q−W )}b, (6)
where x∗(t) := [x∗1(t)
′ ...x∗n(t)
′]′.
(ii) If Q is nonsingular and H is a square root of Q, then
the Nash solution and its opinion dynamics can be expressed
as
u∗(t) = H sinh[H(T − t)] cosh(HT )−1(I −Q−1W )b, (7)
x∗(t) = {Q−1W + cosh[H(T − t)] cosh(HT )−1
(I −Q−1W )}b. (8)
(iii) If Q is nonsingular with a real negative eigenvalue−r2,
then x∗(t) has sustained oscillations for T 6= (2k+1)pi2r and
lim
T→ (2k+1)pi2r
x∗(t)→ ±∞
for every nonnegative integer k.
(iv) If Q is nonsingular with no real negative eigenvalue,
then the opinion dynamics (8) in infinite horizon is given by
lim
T→∞
x∗(t) = [Q−1W + exp(−Hpt) (I −Q−1W )]b, (9)
where Hp ∈ Rnd×nd is a square root of Q having all its
eigenvalues with positive real parts. 
Remark 1: (a) The existence of a Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed only if the choices of influence and stubbornness
matrices and T result in a nonsingular f(QT ). This require-
ment is always met when d = 1 since Q can be shown to have
positive eigenvalues in this single issue case. For d > 1, it may
fail. In Example 2 below, a nonsingular Q having a negative
eigenvalue results in a singular f(QT ) for a particular value of
T and, hence, in a lack of Nash equilibrium. The expectation
5that a Nash equilibrium fails to exist whenever the agents have
inconsistent views towards each other is only partly true. In
fact, in Theorem 1-(i) and in Theorem 2 below, it exists in two
somewhat diametrically opposite cases. (b) The assumption
that Q is nonsingular is convenient in obtaining compact
expressions for u∗(t) and x∗(t). It is also practical, without
loss of generality, since almost all matrices are nonsingular.
(c) Observe that the opinion profile in (8) consists of two parts.
The constant part Q−1Wb can be viewed as a “weighted
average opinion in the network.” The time dependent part,
on the other hand, represents the evolution of the dynamics
dependent on the difference between the opinions of agents
from that average. The evolution itself is dictated by the
eigenvalues of Q in (6) and in (8). (d) By (6) and (8), if
bi = bj for all i, j ∈ N, then b is in the null space of
Q − W so that x∗i (t) = bi for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, an
initial full consensus is preserved in the whole interval. This
reinforces that the game (2) is indeed a model of consensus in
opinion dynamics. On the other hand, as we will demonstrate,
this constant dynamics is the only possible instance of full
consensus because the motive of stubbornness is incorporated
into the model. (e) In case of infinite time horizon, the opinion
vector in the long run, converges to the weighted average of
the initial opinions, i.e., limt→∞ limT→∞ x∗(t) = Q−1Wb.
(f) It is easy to see, by (7), that each best response (optimal
control input) remains bounded for all T ≥ 0 and for T →∞.
This means that no agent needs to change his opinion infinitely
fast, even in an infinite horizon case, i.e., as T → ∞. (g) If
Q is symmetric, then Hp of Proposition 1(iv) is the unique
positive definite square root of (positive definite) Q. △
Example 2: By Proposition 1-(iv), if Q has a real negative
eigenvalue, then a Nash equilibrium fails to exist for some
critical values of T and has persistent oscillations for other
values of T . Consider a dyad with
W11 =
[
0.5 −1
−1 2.5
]
, W12 =
[
1.25 −1
−1 1.25
]
W22 =
[
2 2.5
2.5 3.25
]
, W21 =
[
2 1.5
1.5 1, 25
]
for which eig(Q) = {8.3611, 4.9858, 0.8372,−0.1840}. Let
T = pi/2
√
0.1840 = 3.6619 so that (2k + 1)3.6619 are the
critical values of T at which Nash equilibrium fails to exist.
In fact with b1 = [−0.5 0.5]′, b2 = [1 1]′, and k = 1,
the opinion trajectories diverge to infinity as T → 3(3.6619)
as shown in Fig. 2 (b) and has oscillations for a value less
than but close to this critical one in Fig. 2 (a). Fig. 2 shows
the trajectories for only issue-2 but those for issue-1 have the
same features. Divergence will actually be obtained for all
initial biases except that of full consensus. A main factor that
causes Q to have a negative eigenvalue is that the off-diagonal
entries of the weight matrices of agent-1 and agent-2 have
different signs, i.e., the agents have opposite conceptions about
the correlation of the two issues. △
Using the expression (8), one can also obtain the best
response dynamics xi(t) for every agent-i. It is, however,
possible to display the individual opinion dynamics of each
agent more explicitly to allow easier interpretations. We now
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Fig. 2: Oscillating and divergent opinion trajectories
consider two specializations of the result of Proposition 1:
First, where agents have pairwise similar views and second,
where all the agents are only connected to one agent that will
be called a leader. These two cases come from two extreme
assumptions on the structure of the networks and lead to an
explicit opinion trajectory expression for each agent.
A. Pairwise Similar Views
In the special case of agents having pairwise identical
influence weights, i.e., undirected network at each layer [40],
the existence of a Nash equilibrium is ensured. Since an
influence weight matrix is allowed to be a zero matrix,
pairwise similarity requires that if agent-i leaves agent-j out
of Ni, then agent-j reciprocates and leaves him out of Nj . This
assumption may be justified for instance in a small community
without much external influence. Since stubbornness weights
may be distinct, the individuality of agents is still there. This
subsection pursues the consequences of this type of a harmony
existing in a network.
Theorem 1: (i) If Wij = Wji, ∀ i, j ∈ N, then a Nash
equilibrium exists and is unique. The resulting opinion profile
is given by (8).
(ii) If Wii = F and Wij = G, ∀ i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, then the
unique Nash equilibrium opinion trajectory of agent-i is given
by
xi(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
bj + (F + nG)
−1{F + cosh[Hˆ(T − t)]
cosh(HˆT )−1nG}(bi − 1
n
n∑
j=1
bj), (10)
where Hˆ := (F + nG)
1
2 is the real positive definite square
root of F + nG.
(iii) The opinion dynamics (10) in infinite horizon satisfies
lim
T→∞
xi(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
bj + (F + nG)
−1[F+
exp(−Hˆt)nG](bi − 1
n
n∑
j=1
bj) (11)
with Hˆ = (F + nG)
1
2 . 
The hypothesis in (ii) is that all agents have identical
influence and identical stubbornness weight matrices and,
in effect, means that the agents have “identical” views of
influence from each other. If G 6= 0, then every agent is
6connected to every other agent at each layer of the network, i.e.
complete multilayer network. These “unrealistic” assumptions
portray an ideal situation against which the results obtained in
more realistic situations can be compared.
Remark 2: (a) Observe from (10) that the two terms that
comprise the opinion trajectory are the constant vector of
average initial opinions in the network and the time dependent
term which updates the difference of opinion of agent-i on
each issue against the average opinion. (b) By (11),
lim
t→∞
lim
T→∞
xi(t) = (F + nG)
−1(Fbi +G
n∑
j=1
bj)
so that in the long run, agent-i reaches at a “convex com-
bination” of his own opinion and the average opinion in the
network. (This becomes a more precise comment in the case
of just one issue in Corollary 1 below.) (c) A full consensus is
never reached on any issue for finite T . It is reached as T →∞
and t→∞ on all issues if and only if the stubbornness matrix
tends to zero, in which case the consensus is on the average
initial opinion in the network. (d) By (10), we also have
xi(t)− xj(t) = (F + nG)−1{F + cosh[Hˆ(T − t)]
cosh(HˆT )−1nG}(bi − bj), (12)
for i 6= j, and limT→∞[xi(t) − xj(t)] = (F + nG)−1[F +
exp(−Hˆt)nG](bi − bj), from which one can conclude that
faster convergence to a partial consensus requires the real
positive definite square root Hˆ having all its eigenvalues
“large”. This is the same requirement as the matrix F + nG
having large singular values. △
Example 3: The difference between opinions, (12), does
not vary monotonically with time even in the uniform weights
situation of Theorem 1(ii). We illustrate this in the simple case
of n = 2 and d = 2 with the two positively correlated issues.
Let the initial biases of agents be same as in Example 1, and
suppose vij,kk = 1 and vij,12 = 0.5, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and
k = 1, 2 so that
F = G =
[
5/4 1
1 5/4
]
, (F + 2G)
1
2 =
[ √
3
√
3/2√
3/2
√
3
]
.
The derivative of the first component of (12) vanishes at
t∗ = 1√
3
ln(158 ) ≈ 0.36, which gives a maximum for the
opinion distance on issue-1, i.e., |x1,1(t)−x2,1(t)|. From Fig. 3
(a), it can be seen that agent-1 and agent-2 move away from
each other on issue-1 at the start because of the antagonistic
interaction, but eventually move towards each other. Also
agent-2, by choosing opposite opinions on the issues initially,
[9], manipulates agent-1 to hold contrary opinions even though
agent-1 regards the issues to be positively correlated. △
Corollary 1: If there is only one prevailing issue, i.e., d =
1, and G = g, F = f , xi = xi, bi = bi are scalars, then
for i ∈ N and t ∈ [0, T ] the opinion trajectory in a Nash
equilibrium is given by
xi(t) =
1
n
∑n
j=1 bj +
1
λ
{f + ng cosh[
√
λ(T−t)]
cosh(
√
λT )
}(bi − 1n
∑n
j=1 bj),
where λ = f + ng. 
In this one issue case, the opinion of agent-i converges to
a convex combination of his opinion and the initial average
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Fig. 3: The effect of initial biases
opinion in the network, given by
lim
T→∞
lim
t→T
xi(t) =
fbi + g
∑n
j=1 bj
f + ng
.
B. A Network with One Leader
Consider a network where all the agents are only influenced
by one agent called the leader. The leader endures to his own
opinions on the issues, which are not influenced by other
agents throughout the interval [0, T ]. The neighborhood of the
leader (agent-1) is N1 = ∅ and the neighborhood of all other
agents is Ni = {1}, ∀ i ∈ N \ {1} and k ∈ D. It follows that,
in this special case, we have
Q =


W11
−W21 M2
...
. . .
−Wn1 Mn

, (13)
in which all entries left blank are zero matrices and Mi =
Wii +Wi1, ∀ i ∈ N \ {1}.
Theorem 2: (i) For a network where all the agents are only
influenced by agent-1, a unique Nash equilibrium exists with
the resulting opinion profile given by (8).
(ii) If W11 has no common eigenvalue with any Wi1+Wii,
for i ∈ N \ {1}, then, in the unique Nash equilibrium that
results, the opinion profile of each agent for t ∈ [0, T ] is
given by x1(t) = b1 and
xi(t) = (Wii +Wi1)
−1{Wiibi +Wi1b1
+ cosh[Hˆi(T − t)] cosh(HˆiT )−1Wi1(bi − b1)}, (14)
where Hˆi := (Wii+Wi1)
1
2 is the real positive definite square
root.
(iii) In the infinite horizon case, we have
lim
T→∞
xi(t) = (Wii +Wi1)
−1[Wiibi +Wi1b1
+ exp(−Hˆit)Wi1(bi − b1)],
in which
lim
t→∞
lim
T→∞
xi(t) = (Wii +Wi1)
−1(Wiibi +Wi1b1). 
Remark 3: (a) The sufficient condition of Theorem 2-(ii)
is satisfied for almost all choices of weight matrices. This
condition ensures that a real positive definite square root of
(13) exists. (b) The expression (14) has again two parts. The
constant first part (Wii + Wi1)
−1(Wiibi + Wi1b1) can be
viewed as a weighted convex combination of the initial opinion
vectors of the leader and agent-i. The dynamic second part
updates their difference in opinions in the interval [0, T ].
7(c) By Theorem 2-(iii), the opinion reached in the limit by
agent-i thus turns out to be a convex combination of his own
opinions (opinion vector) and those of the leader. (d) We have,
∀ i ∈ N \ {1},
xi(t)− x1(t) = (Wii +Wi1)−1{Wii + cosh[Hˆi(T − t)]
cosh(HˆiT )
−1Wi1}(bi − b1)
and
lim
T→∞
[xi(t)− x1(t)] = (Wii +Wi1)−1{Wii
+ exp(−Hˆit)Wi1}(bi − b1).
Agent-i will be of the same opinion as the leader in the long
run if and only if he is not at all stubborn, i.e., Wii → 0. The
larger all eigenvalues of Hˆi are, the faster will be the partial
consensus that will be reached on the issues. △
Corollary 2: If there is only one prevailing issue, i.e., d =
1, andWi1 = wi1,Wii = wii, xi = xi and bi = bi are scalars
∀ i ∈ N, then a Nash equilibrium for a network with one leader
exists and is unique. The opinion dynamics of agents in this
Nash equilibrium for t ∈ [0, T ] is given by x1(t) = b1 and for
i ∈ N \ {1},
xi(t) =
wiibi + wi1b1
λi
+
wi1
λi
cosh[λ
1
2
i (T − t)]
cosh(λ
1
2
i T )
(bi − b1),
where λi := wii + wi1. 
IV. EXAMPLES WITH MULTIPLE STAGES
We now investigate two hybrid (continuous and discrete)
games of multiple stages. In these networks, the agents interact
with each other with some probability and the interaction
network at each stage is generated accordingly, [14]. When the
agents interact with each other, they determine their influence
matrices depending on their bounded confidence, as given in
Section II-A.
Example 4: In a social network there are two political
parties, party-A and party-B, their supporters, and a group of
neutral people. Suppose the size of the community is n = 102,
including the two leaders of the parties. The leader of each
party forms his opinions on issues according to the party’s
motto. The party-A claims to be “tough on crime” and party-
B, confronting party-A, claims to be an advocate for “human
rights.”
The current debates are about two positively correlated
issues. Issue-1 is eradication of death penalty and issue-2,
private ownership of guns. Suppose ri,12 = 0.5, ∀ i ∈ N, so
that people agree that the two issues are well-correlated. Party-
A, since it is “tough on crime,” holds negative opinions on both
issues, i.e., death penalty should not be eradicated and private
ownership of guns should not be allowed. So, we can represent
the initial opinion of party-A by a vector b1 = [−1 − 1]′.
However, party-B differs from party-A on both issues and
holds the opinions that death penalty should be eradicated
and private ownership of guns should be allowed for self-
defensive purposes. Therefore, the initial opinions of party-B
can be represented by b2 = [1 1]
′. We assume both parties
propose reasonable arguments in support of their opinions so
that they have almost same number of supporters. Then we
have N = PA ∪ PB ∪ PN ∪ {1} ∪ {2}; where PA, PB and
PN are the sets of party-A supporters, party-B supporters and
neutral people, respectively. And suppose |PA| = |PB| = 25
and |PN | = 50.
Members of the community discuss the issues with each
other and form their opinions every day. During normal cir-
cumstances, the number of people that each member interacts
with depends on how sociable the members of the community
are, which can be roughly described by the probability ρij
that some agent-i interacts with agent-j. Suppose the game (2)
is played five times and at the beginning of each game, the
probabilities ρij are used to generate a two-layered network,
which is considered as an interaction network throughout the
game. Suppose ρij = 0.2, and the initial opinions of PA, PB
and PN are uniformly distributed in the intervals [−1.5,−0.5],
[0.5, 1.5] and (−0.5, 0.5), respectively. The final opinions of
the agents in each game are considered as their initial opinions
for the next game, and suppose T = 5 is the duration of each
game. Also, for simplicity, consider only one attribute, i.e.,
social status, for every agent. And say ai = 1 if agent-i is a
leader, otherwise ai = 0.
We assume that party-A supporters do a propaganda about
the issues. For instance, they can increase their publicity by
getting more media coverage or by starting a social media
campaign. By doing so, it is almost certain that neutral
people interact with (passively observe) party-A supporters,
i.e., ρij → 1, for i ∈ PN , j ∈ PA.
When agent-i interacts with agent-j, the entries of Vij are
determined as
vij,kk =
{
2aj + 0.5, if |bi,k − bj,k| ≤ εi;
0, otherwise;
where the bounded confidence εi = 0.5, ∀ i ∈ N \ {1, 2}; and
εi = 0.1, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Also, suppose vii,kk = ai + 0.1,
∀ i ∈ N and k ∈ {1, 2}, so that the leaders are more stubborn.
And vij,12 = ri,12 = 0.5, ∀ i, j ∈ N. The opinion trajectories
are obtained by (8), and are shown in Fig. 4. Because of the
propaganda, the agents in PN mostly interact with those who
are in PA, and seldom interact with those in PB . Therefore,
they conform their opinions with PA. And as the agents in PB
interact with the agents in PN , they get influenced because
some agents in PN lie in the bounded confidence of agents in
PB . Hence, they change their opinions by moving towards
negative side on both issues. And with them moves along
the party-B leader, since he cannot attract the followers if his
opinions are dissimilar to the society’s opinion.
Example 5: Again consider two prevailing issues with
n = 50, T = 5, and suppose the game is played in 10
stages. At each stage, agent-i interacts with agent-j with some
probability ρij ∈ [0.3, 0.7], and
vij,kk =
{
0.8, if |bi,k − bj,k| ≤ εi;
0, otherwise,
where εi ∈ [0, 1] is a bounded confidence for agent-i. Notice
that the agents, unlike in Example 4, are heterogeneous
since their bounded confidences are different. Also, suppose
vii,kk = 0.1 and vij,kl = ri,12, ∀i, j ∈ N, k, l ∈ {1, 2}, and
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Fig. 4: Opinion trajectories of the community with two polit-
ical parties.
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Fig. 5: Consensus formation
k 6= l. The opinion trajectories, when ri,12 = 1, ∀i ∈ N, are
shown in Fig. 5 (a), whereas the trajectories when ri,12 = 1,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , 25}, and rj,12 = −1, for j ∈ {26, . . . , 50},
are shown in Fig. 5 (b). The purpose of this example is to
show that when the game is repeated several times, the agents
move towards (partial) consensus. That is, repetition of the
interactions eventually leads to a consensus, [10], even when
the agents have different conceptions about the issues, as in
the case of Fig. 5 (b).
V. CONCLUSIONS
The model of opinion dynamics here has a number of
features that puts it apart from those in the literature: 1) It is a
game theoretic model played by the members in a society but
a dynamic game as opposed to static. 2) It is a noncooperative
game and our focus is on a Nash equilibrium as a solution that
has the feature that if a player uses his best response strategy,
then he is not worse off even when all the others play their
best strategies. 3) In a multiple issue game, a Nash equilibrium
may not exist in certain information structures and/or certain
values for the weights used in forming the costs. 4) The
model concludes that from individual motives of the agents,
a collective behavior results. In a wide range of information
structures, this collective behavior can be considered as a
partial consensus in the network. 5) The existence condition
for a Nash equilibrium turns out to be some kind of harmony
in a society. But this harmony can arise from diametrically
opposite characteristics of individuals – similarity in views
or assenting to authorities in a society. 6) Games of multiple
issues result in much more intricate dynamics than those on
a single issue. The most prominent difference comes from
being able to incorporate a penalization of inconsistency of an
agent’s neighbors on correlated issues.
The obvious future direction for research along similar
lines would be to consider more sophisticated motives (cost
functionals), also allowing the possibility of having non-
uniform motives in a society, like, non-quadratic ones along
with quadratic cost functionals.
APPENDIX
A. Conditions for Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
Let us first observe that the cost functional (1) is quadratic
since it can be written in the form
Ji(z,ui) = 1
2
∫ T
0
(z′Giz+ u′iui) dt, (15)
where z = [z′1, . . . , z
′
n]
′, and
zi = [∆
′
i1, . . . ,∆
′
i(i−1),∆
′
ii,∆
′
i(i+1), . . . ,∆
′
in]
′
with ∆ij := xi−xj , for j 6= i, and ∆ii := xi−bi, ∀ i, j ∈ N.
Also, Gi = Hi ⊗ Ki, where Hi ∈ {0, 1}n×n has 1 only
at (i, i) location, and Ki = diag [Wi1, . . . ,Win] ∈ Rnd×nd.
Assumption 1 thus ensures that each (1) subject to ui = x˙i
has a unique minimum. Using the results in [5] and [13], it
follows that if the game (2) has a Nash equilibrium then it
is unique. Although, in principle, the cost funcions depicted
in (15) can be used to derive the unique open-loop Nash
equilibrium expressions using the techniques in [13] or [5],
it turns out that it is easier to do this by using the following
necessary conditions (see [5] or [26]):
u∗i (t) = arg min
ui∈Si
Hi(pi,x,bi,ui),
x˙i(t) =
∂Hi
∂pi
, p˙i(t) = −∂Hi
∂xi
, (16)
xi(0) = bi, pi(T ) = 0, i ∈ N,
9where pi : [0, T ] → Rnd is a costate function and Hi is the
Hamiltonian given by
Hi = 1
2
{[
∑
j∈Ni
∆′ijWij∆ij ] + ∆
′
iiWii∆ii + u
′
iui}+ p′iui.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
The combined state and costate equations from (16) give[
x˙
p˙
]
=
[
0 −I
−Q 0
] [
x
p
]
+
[
0 0
W 0
] [
b
p(0)
]
,
which has the solution of the form[
x
p
]
= (Φ(t) + Ψ(t)B)
[
b
p(0)
]
, (17)
where
Φ(t) = eAt =
[
φ11(t) φ12(t)
φ21(t) φ22(t)
]
,
Ψ(t) =
∫ t
0
eA(t−τ)dτ =
[
ψ11(t) ψ12(t)
ψ21(t) ψ22(t)
]
,
A :=
[
0 −I
−Q 0
]
, B :=
[
0 0
W 0
]
.
Note that
Φ(t) = L−1{(sI −A)−1} (18)
= L−1
{[
s(s2I −Q)−1 −(s2I −Q)−1
−Q(s2I −Q)−1 s(s2I −Q)−1
]}
.
The state transition matrix Φ(t) and the matrix Ψ(t) are
calculated using the formal power series in s−1 of each block
in (18) and, with (3) in view, are given by
Φ(t) =
[
φ11(t) φ12(t)
φ21(t) φ22(t)
]
=
[
f(Qt) −g(Qt)
−Qg(Qt) f(Qt)
]
,
Ψ(t) =
[
ψ11(t) ψ12(t)
ψ21(t) ψ22(t)
]
=
[
g(Qt) −h(Qt)
−Qh(Qt) g(Qt)
]
.
From (17), we have x(t) = [φ11(t)+ψ12(t)W ]b+φ12(t)p(0).
Also, p(t) = [φ21(t) + ψ22(t)W ]b+ φ22(t)p(0). Evaluating
at t = T and employing the boundary condition p(T ) = 0,
we have φ22(T )p(0) = −[φ21(T ) + ψ22(T )W ]b. In order to
be able to solve for p(0) for any initial state b, it is necessary
and sufficient that φ22(T ) = f(QT ) is invertible. We then
obtain p(0) = −φ22(T )−1[φ21(T ) + ψ22(T )W ]b, and
x(t) = {φ11(t) + ψ12(t)W + φ12(t)φ22(T )−1
[Qφ12(T )− φ12(T )W ]}b
by using that φ21 = Qφ12 and ψ22 = −φ12. Substituting the
expressions in terms of f(Qt), g(Qt), h(Qt) above, and noting
that functions of Q commute, it is not difficult to arrive at (6)
and (5), also using u(t) = x˙(t). This establishes the necessity
and sufficiency of the condition that f(QT ) is nonsingular
for a Nash equilibrium to exist and proves Proposition 1-
(i). Whenever Q is nonsingular, at least one square root H
of Q exists. Then f(Qt) = Qh(Qt) + I = cosh(Ht) and
Hg(Qt) = sinh(Ht), which are independent of H , so that (5)
and (6) result in (7) and (8), proving Proposition 1(ii). To prove
Proposition 1-(iii), let H be any square root of Q and let J be
its Jordan normal form so thatH = PJP−1 for P of Fact 1. If
Q has a negative eigenvalue, say −r2, then as in Fact 1, there
are Jordan block(s) Jr =
√−1Kr associated with that eigen-
value for which cosh(Jrt) = cos(Krt) for t ≥ 0. Then, the
corresponding block in P−1 cosh[H(T − t)] cosh(HT )−1P =
cosh[J(T − t)] cosh(JT )−1 has the expression cos[Kr(T −
t)] cos(KrT )
−1 = cos(Krt) + sin(Krt) tan(KrT ) is un-
bounded as t approaches T = (2k + 1)pi/2r, for every
nonnegative integer k, which results in unbounded (8) for all
initial values b (except the full consensus of the same bi for
i ∈ N). For any other value of T , tan(KrT ) will have a finite
value and there will be oscillations of finite (but possibly large)
amplitudes in all trajectories associated with the d issues. This
proves the claims in Proposition 1(iii). If Q is free of any
real negative eigenvalue, then it has real square roots H , all
of which have eigenvalues with nonzero real parts including
a square root Hp with eigenvalues of all positive real parts.
Note that Hp = H+ − H− for any square root H , where
H = H+ + H−, H+ = P−1J+P , H− = P−1J−P , and
J = J+ + J− is a decomposition of J into two matrices
having blocks that correspond to eigenvalues of positive and
negative real parts, respectively. It is now straightforward to
show, using this decomposition, that if H is any square root of
Q, then limT→∞ cosh[H(T − t)] cosh(HT )−1 = exp(−Hpt)
for every t ≥ 0. Note that this limit remains bounded for
every t ∈ [0,∞) and goes to zero as t → ∞. This proves
Proposition 1-(iv).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
If the agents have pairwise identical influence weights, then
Q =


M1 −W12 . . . −W1n
−W12 M2
. . .
...
.
..
. . .
. . . −W(n−1)n
−W1n . . . −W(n−1)n Mn

,
which is positive definite since, for any yi, i ∈ N, computing
[y′1 . . .y
′
n]Q[y
′
1 . . .y
′
n]
′, we get
y′1W11y1 + · · ·+ y′nWnnyn
+
∑
∀ i,j∈N,i6=j
(y′i − y′j)Wij(yi − yj) > 0,
where we used the expression in (4) for Mi’s and the hypoth-
esis that Wij is nonnegative definite for i 6= j and positive
definite for i = j. It follows by Proposition 1-(i) that a unique
Nash equilibrium exists, proving (i).
To see (ii), note by hypothesis that, the matrix Q simplifies
to Q = In ⊗ (F + nG) − I ⊗ G, where I is the n × n
matrix of all 1’s. It can be verified that Q = P−1DP , where
D := diag[F + nG, ..., F + nG,F ], in which F + nG is
repeated n− 1 times and the matrices P , P−1 are
P = (
1
n
I −K)⊗ Id, P−1 =
[
1′n−1 1
−In−1 1n−1
]
⊗ Id,
where K is n × n matrix with ones at (i, i + 1) locations
for i = 1, . . . , (n − 1). It follows that Q 12 = P−1D 12P and
cosh(Q
1
2 t) = P−1 cosh(D
1
2 t)P . It is again a straightforward
computation that (8) yields (10), which proves (ii). And the
limits follow by
lim
T→∞
cosh[Hˆ(T − t)] cosh(HˆT )−1 = exp(−Hˆt).
10
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Note that the lower block triangular Q of (13) is nonsin-
gular with positive eigenvalues by positive definiteness of its
diagonal blocks. Hence, f(QT ) is nonsingular and (i) holds
by Proposition 1-(i). By the hypothesis in (ii), a solution X
to the Sylvester equation XWˆ1 − Wˆ2X = Wˆ3 exists, which
implies that
Q =
[
Wˆ1 0
−Wˆ3 Wˆ2
]
= R−1
[
Wˆ1 0
0 Wˆ2
]
R,
with R :=
[
I 0
X I
]
, where Wˆ1 = W11, Wˆ2 = diag[W21 +
W22, . . . ,Wn1+Wnn] and Wˆ3 = [W
′
21, . . . ,W
′
n1]
′. It follows
that
Q
1
2 = R−1
[
Wˆ
1
2
1 0
0 Wˆ
1
2
2
]
R,
is a real positive definite square root, which gives an expres-
sion for cosh(Q
1
2 t) in terms of Hˆi = (Wii + Wi1)
1
2 for
i = 2, ..., n. This proves (ii) by Proposition 1-(ii). Limits
in (iii) easily follow by the expression (14). The square root
Wˆ
1
2
1 = W
1
2
11, which appears in Q
1
2 , cancels out in the final
expressions (14).
Finally, we note that Corollaries 1 and 2, that appeared in
[32], are simple consequences of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2,
respectively.
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